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A decision maker wishes to fill a vacancy with a fixed wage. Candidates
who are more valuable to the decision maker are less likely to be available. The
candidates suffer a disutility from filling the position when they are ranked low
on the decision maker’s preference list. However, the decision maker’s preferences
are his private information. Therefore, the candidates infer the decision maker’s
preference list from information revealed by the number of failed offers. We
explore the adverse effect of the social component in the candidates’ preferences
on the decision maker’s ability to recruit a suitable candidate.
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1 Introduction
Salary is typically one of a combination of factors that affect a job candidate’s decision
to accept or reject a job offer. In addition to financial compensation, candidates often
try to assess how much their new employer likes them and appreciates their skills.
This endogenous assessment may signal the quality of the match, the likelihood of
being respected and kindly treated in the new workplace, and the chances of early
promotion or dismissal. Apart from its instrumental value as a proxy for these other
dimensions of overall job satisfaction, a job candidate’s desirability to his employer
may be of fundamental value to the candidate due to social motives. The idea that
people tend to like, think highly of, and want to interact with those who like them is
supported by evidence from the social psychology literature dating back to Aronson
and Worchel (1966). In the context of hiring, a job candidate who feels that he is not
the employer’s first choice for the position might refuse to fill a vacancy that he would
otherwise be happy to fill.
Unlike wages, which are relatively easy to observe and verify, a potential employee
is typically less informed about the extent to which his potential employer likes him
and appreciates his skills. Nevertheless, his perceived desirability to the employer may
affect the employee’s decision to accept or reject a job offer. It is easier to identify the
effects of desirability considerations on this decision in labour markets in which wages
are highly regulated (e.g., public sector positions, some European academic labour
markets) and job candidates cannot make inferences from the offered compensation.
Instead, candidates form their assessments about the extent to which their potential
employer values them based on observables such as the time between the posting of
a vacancy and the time a recruiter contacts them to schedule an interview, the order
in which candidates are interviewed, and how many candidates are considered for
the position. The job candidates’ inferences make the potential employer’s problem
a strategic one. In what order should the employer approach the candidates in the
presence of social motives? Can he benefit from withholding information from the
candidates or from delegating his decision to an uninformed party?
We study the effects of the above strategic elements on an employer’s ability to
appoint a suitable candidate. In our model, there is a decision maker (DM) who wishes
to fill a vacancy with an exogenous wage. The DM approaches potential candidates
sequentially. Each candidate is characterised by his availability and his value to the
DM. The former (latter) aspect is the candidate’s (DM’s) private information. Value
and availability are negatively correlated, reflecting that better candidates are typically
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more valuable in the market. The DM can make offers to all candidates and there is
no cost of delay. The candidates in our model suffer a disutility from accepting an
offer if they are ranked low on the DM’s preference list. This complicates the DM’s
scheduling problem since candidates may infer their relative position on his preference
list from the order in which he approaches them or from the number of failed offers
(the candidates’ beliefs about their ranking are also affected by their outside options,
i.e., their availability).
Without taking social motives into account, the DM will approach the candidates
according to his preference ordering (i.e., according to the candidates’ values). To
illustrate the trade-off between value and availability that emerges endogenously in
our model, consider the above scheduling strategy and suppose that candidates reject
the DM’s offers if they are unavailable or if they think that they are not ranked first on
his preference list. If the first candidate who is approached by the DM is unavailable,
the DM will make a job offer to the next candidate on his preference list. The latter
candidate can infer from the timing of the offer that he is ranked second and, therefore,
he will reject the DM’s offer. If, however, the DM takes this into account and believes
that his favourite candidate is unlikely to be available, he might give up on the above
scheduling strategy in favour of first approaching a candidate who is ranked lower on
his preference list but is more likely to be available. However, a different scheduling
strategy has implications on the inferences made by the candidates in equilibrium.
For instance, if the DM approaches lower-ranked candidates first, a candidate who is
approached first must infer that he is not ranked first on the DM’s preference list and
reject the DM’s offer. This complicates the DM’s problem and further exacerbates the
adverse effect of the social motives.
Our main result is that under a mild condition on the distribution of candidates’
types, when the number of candidates is large, in every symmetric Nash equilibrium
the DM is unable to fill the vacancy. This result implies that having many potential
candidates makes it hard for the DM to recruit a candidate, and contrasts with a result
that without the social component, the DM is always better off when the number of
candidates is increased.
We examine different mechanisms that allow the DM to control the information his
offers reveal to the candidates. In particular, we compare between the case in which
the DM makes his offers publicly and the case in which he makes them privately such
that candidates cannot observe the number of failed offers. While the DM is better off
making his offers privately when the candidates’ social motives are weak, he is better
off making them publicly when their social motives are strong.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 provides an
illustrative example and Section 4 presents the general analysis. Section 5 compares
the cases of private and public offers. Section 6 covers the related literature and Section
7 concludes by discussing a few extensions and implications. Proofs that do not appear
in the main text are to be found in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Let I = {1, ..., n} be a set of candidates and suppose that a decision maker (DM) wishes
to appoint one and only one of these candidates to a position. Let vi denote the DM’s
value from appointing candidate i ∈ I to the position. We assume that v1, ..., vn are n
random variables drawn independently from a density f > 0 on [vl, vh], vh > vl ≥ 0.
The values’ realisations are the DM’s private information while f is commonly known.
For each candidate i ∈ I, xi = | {j ∈ I|vj > vi} | is the number of candidates who have
a higher value than i. Let k ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} and let c > 1. The utility that candidate
i ∈ I derives from accepting the DM’s offer is 1 if xi < k and 1 − c otherwise.1 The
utility derived by each candidate i ∈ I from rejecting the DM’s offer is 0.
Let si ∈ {0, 1} denote candidate i’s availability, where si = 1 (respectively, si = 0)
means that i is available (respectively, unavailable). Define p (vi) := Pr (si = 1|vi). We
assume that p : [vl, vh]→ [0, 1] is continuous and nonincreasing in v. That is, there is
a negative correlation between each candidate’s value to the DM and the probability
that the candidate is available (better candidates are less likely to be available). Each
candidate’s availability is his private information while p is commonly known. One can
interpret si as agent i’s outside option, such that unavailable (respectively, available)
candidates are simply candidates with a good (respectively, bad) outside option.
Denote the set of rounds by N = {1, ..., n}. In each round t ∈ N , the DM makes
a binding offer to one candidate. If that candidate accepts, then he fills the position
and the game ends. If he rejects the offer, then at round t + 1 the DM makes an
offer to a candidate who has not rejected an offer previously. If by the end of round
n the DM’s offers have all been rejected, the game ends and his payoff is 0. Denote
the set of permutations of N by ΠN . A pure strategy for the DM is a permutation of
N for each realisation (v1, ..., vn). In other words, a pure strategy a : [vl, vh]
n → ΠN
maps realisations of candidates’ values into permutations of the n rounds. A mixed
1One can interpret c as the intensity of the candidates’ social preferences. At the end of this section
we analyse a benchmark model in which the candidates’ preferences do not contain a social component
(i.e., c = 0). We do not address the case of c ∈ (0, 1) since its analysis is similar to the case of c = 0.
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strategy α : [vl, vh]
n → ∆ (ΠN) maps realisations of candidates’ values into probability
distributions over permutations of N . For each realisation (v1, ..., vn), let α (pi|v1, ..., vn)
denote the probability that the mixed strategy α maps the realisation (v1, ..., vn) to the
permutation pi. For each realisation (v1, ..., vn), permutation pi, and round t ∈ N , we
denote the candidate who receives an offer in round t according to pi by pit (v1, ..., vn).
We assume that a candidate who is unavailable rejects the DM’s offer. For each
available candidate i ∈ I, a behavioural strategy σi : N → [0, 1] is the probability
of accepting an offer conditional on the round in which it is made. We denote the
probability that an available candidate i accepts an offer in round t by σti . We say that
the DM’s strategy a treats the candidates in a symmetric manner if it is not conditioned
on the candidates’ labels. Formally, a treats the candidates in a symmetric manner
if a maps candidate j to round h under (v1, ..., vn) if and only if a maps candidate pii
to round h under (vpi1 , ..., vpin) whenever both vi 6= vj for each vi, vj ∈ (v1, ..., vn), and
(vpi1 , ..., vpin) is a permutation of (v1, ..., vn) such that pii = j. Mixed strategies that
treat the candidates in a symmetric manner are defined analogously.
We restrict our attention to Nash equilibria in which the DM’s strategy treats the
candidates in a symmetric manner and the candidates use symmetric strategies (that
is, σti = σ
t
j for each i, j ∈ I and t ∈ N). We refer to this solution concept as a symmetric
Nash equilibrium (SNE). Since the candidates’ strategies are symmetric we omit the
subscript from the description of their strategies and use σt to denote the probability
that an available candidate who receives an offer in round t ∈ N accepts it.
Discussion: Modelling Assumptions
Preferences versus behaviour
In the context of this paper, there are two types of social motives that we can consider:
the candidates may care about the order in which they are offered a position (e.g.,
whether they receive an offer first or not) or about their relative ranking in the DM’s
preference list. Both motives can follow from the existence of an audience of outside
observers who make inferences about the candidates’ ranking in the DM’s preference list
(correct inferences in the case of the latter motive and possibly incorrect inferences in
the case of the former motive). In both cases, we can interpret the disutility derived by a
candidate as a disutility from working for an employer who made him look bad in public.
We focus on the latter motive, which may also result from the other considerations,
elaborated in the introduction. If, in addition to the motive which we focus on, we were
to incorporate the former motive into our model (e.g., by assuming that the candidates
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obtain a disutility if they accept offers in a late round), it would only exacerbate the
adverse effect of the social component in the model and strengthen our results.
Symmetry
Restricting our attention to equilibria in which the DM’s strategy treats the candidates
in a symmetric manner enables us to obtain full support and thereby avoid making
assumptions about the candidates’ beliefs off the equilibrium path. To see this, observe
that since the candidates’ values are i.i.d., there is a strictly positive probability for
each permutation of the DM’s offers.
We also assume that the candidates use symmetric strategies. Let us consider
the main effect of this assumption. When the candidates’ strategies are symmetric, a
candidate who receives an offer in round t does not care who are the t−1 candidates who
rejected the DM’s offers in rounds 1, ..., t− 1. This information affects the candidate’s
beliefs about his relative ranking only when the other candidates’ strategies differ.
If we assume that an available candidate who receives an offer knows only the time
t ∈ N in which he is approached rather than the complete history of offers made by the
DM, then we can relax the assumption that the candidates use symmetric strategies,
without changing any of the paper’s results. Under the symmetry assumption, there
is no need to distinguish between the case in which an agent knows only the time in
which he receives an offer and the case in which he knows the complete history. We
keep the symmetry assumption since it significantly simplifies the exposition.
A Benchmark
Before proceeding to the analysis, we present a simple result to serve as a benchmark.
It establishes that in the absence of social motives (c = 0), in the unique SNE, the
DM approaches the candidates in the order of their values (i.e., he approaches his
most-valued candidate first, his second-most-valued candidate second, and so on).
Claim 1 Suppose that c = 0. Then, in the unique SNE, the DM approaches the
candidates in the order of their values.
Proof. Since c = 0, each available candidate accepts an offer regardless of the round
in which it is made. Therefore, approaching the candidates in the order of their values
first-order stochastically dominates any other strategy.
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This result follows directly from the fact that there is no cost of delay because
available candidates always accept the DM’s offers. That is, there is no cost in making
offers to candidates who are less likely to be available. However, once candidates have
social preferences, their likelihood of being available plays an important role in the
DM’s strategic considerations.
3 An Illustrative Example
Let us assume that there are two candidates and that each of them prefers to fill the
position to not doing so if and only if he believes that he is ranked first on the DM’s
preference list with a probability of more than 1
2
. The latter assumption is equivalent
to assuming that c = 2. To focus on the main intuitions of the model, we simplify
it to the bare minimum by assuming that the candidates’ values are drawn from the
uniform distribution on [1
2
, 1] and that p (v) = 1− v.
In what order should the DM approach the candidates? A natural scheduling
strategy is to approach the candidate whom he likes best first. The problem with this
strategy is that the candidates infer their exact ranking from the timing of the DM’s
offers. As a result, the candidate who receives the second offer rejects it. Conditional
on having his second offer rejected, the DM will prefer to make his first offer to the
candidate for whom p (v) v is maximised. However, since p (v) v = (1− v) v is decreas-
ing in v, the candidate for whom p (v) v is maximised is the candidate who is least
valued by the DM. Therefore, the strategy of always approaching the most-preferred
candidate first cannot be a part of an SNE.
The social motives in this model have an adverse effect as candidates who believe
that the DM likes others better than he likes them reject his offers. How strong is this
effect? Can it be the case that, regardless of their availability, both candidates reject
the DM’s offers in an SNE? Such an SNE would be inefficient as even when the DM’s
most-preferred candidate is available, he will refuse to fill the position. It turns out
that such an equilibrium exists.
Claim 2 There exists an SNE in which the DM randomises uniformly between permu-
tations and the candidates reject both of his offers (i.e., σ1 = σ2 = 0).
Let us consider the information that is (not) revealed to the candidates in this
SNE. Since the DM randomises uniformly between the two permutations, the candi-
dates learn nothing from the order in which the DM approaches them. Since p (v)
is decreasing in v, conditional on being available, a candidate’s interim belief is that
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he is ranked first with a probability of less than2 1
2
. Therefore, the candidate who is
approached first rejects the DM’s offer regardless of his availability. As a result, the
candidate who receives the offer second learns nothing from the fact that the first offer
was rejected and rejects the DM’s offer as well.
The SNE that we have described results in the worst possible outcome for the DM.
In our setting, there may exist multiple equilibria so that it makes sense to examine
the DM’s payoff in other SNEs. The following claim establishes that in all of these
SNEs, the DM cannot recruit any candidate.
Claim 3 In every SNE, all of the DM’s offers are rejected (regardless of the candidates’
availability).
First, let us understand why an SNE in which offers are accepted with some proba-
bility in one round and always rejected in the other round (e.g., an SNE in which σ1 > 0
and σ2 = 0) cannot exist. If there were an SNE in which candidates only accept offers
made in the first round, then the DM would settle the trade-off between value and
availability in favour of first approaching the candidate for whom p (v) v = (1− v) v is
maximised. However, this candidate is the one who is more likely to be available and
less valued by the DM. As a result, a candidate who receives the first offer must infer
that he is ranked second on the DM’s preference list and reject his offer.
Second, we provide the intuition for the nonexistence of an SNE in which offers
are accepted with strictly positive probability in both rounds (i.e., an SNE in which
σ1 > 0 and σ2 > 0). Consider an available candidate i and recall that because of
the negative correlation between value and availability, candidate i’s interim belief is
Pr {vi > vj|si = 1} < 12 . For candidate i to accept an offer, he must believe that he is
ranked first with a probability of at least 1
2
. Hence, for i to accept the DM’s offer in the
first round, he must infer some positive information about his ranking from the fact
that the DM approached him first. However, if i is ranked first on the DM’s preference
list, then j is ranked second on that list, and vice versa. Therefore, when i makes a
positive inference about his ranking from the fact that he receives the first offer, this
necessarily implies that candidate j makes a negative inference about his own ranking
from the fact that i is approached first. Thus, accepting the DM’s offer cannot be a
best response for both i and j.
In equilibrium, the DM’s strategy is optimal with respect to his preferences. This
creates a problem for the DM as he cannot control the information his strategy reveals
to the candidates. In the example, p (v) v is decreasing in v so that candidates make
2The exact probability is calculated in the proof of Claim 2.
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negative inferences about their ranking when they receive an offer and this leads them
to reject it. If the DM could instead commit to a suboptimal strategy, for example, to
making the first offer to the candidate who is ranked first on his preference list, the
problem would be partially solved. In such a case, an available candidate who receives
the first offer will infer that he is ranked first on the DM’s preference list and accept
it.
At this point, we would like to mention that there exist nonsymmetric Nash equilib-
ria in this setting.3 In the appendix, we provide an example of such a Nash equilibrium
and generalise Claim 3 by showing that in every Nash equilibrium all of the DM’s offers
are rejected.
4 Analysis
In the example, we made several simplifying assumptions that helped us present the
main ideas underlying the model. For example, the assumption that p (v) v is decreasing
in v implies that when there is only one “effective” offer to make, for any realisation
(v1, v2), the DM makes that offer to the least-valued candidate. When p (v) v is non-
monotone in v and the DM has one effective offer to make, he makes this offer to the
most-valued candidate in some realisations and to the least-valued one in others. In
this section, we show that for large values of n, the same logic leads to unravelling even
when we relax the assumption that p (v) v is decreasing in v.
Another key assumption of the example is that n = 2. This allows us to calculate
the candidates’ beliefs by hand and show that an SNE in which offers are accepted
with a strictly positive probability in both rounds cannot exist. When n is large, the
difference between the belief of a candidate who receives the first offer and the belief
of a candidate who has observed many failed offers can be so great that, a priori, it is
not clear if the argument presented in the example will work.
In this section, we relax the above limitations and focus on the adverse effect of
social motives on the DM’s ability to hire a suitable candidate. The first proposition
provides a tight sufficient condition for the existence of an SNE that induces the worst
outcome possible for the DM.




. For any f and p (v), a profile of strategies in
which σ1 = ... = σn = 0 and the DM mixes uniformly among all permutations is an
SNE.
3I thank an anonymous referee for this point.
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The condition in Proposition 1 implies that a candidate who believes that his like-
lihood of being among the top k candidates is “lower than average” will not be willing
to accept an offer. Without receiving any information, no candidate believes that he
is better than the average candidate. Therefore, all of the candidates reject the DM’s
offers. Although it is only a sufficient condition for the existence of such an SNE, it




, then one can find a distribution of candidates’
values and a function p (v) such that the DM’s offers are accepted with strictly positive
probability in each SNE.
The next proposition is the paper’s main result. We show that under a mild as-
sumption about the distribution of types, the DM is unable to hire anyone in any
SNE. This implies that in contrast to a setting with no social preferences, having many
potential candidates makes it harder for the DM to appoint a candidate.
Proposition 2 Fix k, let v? ∈ (vl, vh), and suppose that vp (v) is strictly decreasing
in v for v > v?. There exists a number n? such that for each n > n?, in every SNE,
all of the DM’s offers are rejected (i.e., σ1 = ... = σn = 0).
Proposition 2 establishes that increasing the number of candidates may decrease the
DM’s highest SNE payoff. Recall that in the absence of social preferences, increasing
the number of candidates strictly increases the DM’s payoff. This effect is generated
because it becomes harder for the DM to signal his preferences to the candidates whom
he likes most as the number of candidates increases.
To provide a clear intuition for the proof, suppose for a moment that the DM has
only one offer he can make. He will make that offer to the candidate i with the maximal
p (vi) vi. Candidate i need not be the candidate with the maximal value for the DM.
By our assumption that vp (v) is strictly decreasing in v for v > v?, if the DM faces a
realisation in which there are k′ > k candidates with values greater than v?, then he
will make his only offer to a candidate who is not among his k-most-valued candidates
(i.e., to a candidate i such that xi ≥ k).
The above argument can be applied to the last round in which the DM’s offer might
be accepted in an SNE. Consider an SNE in which the DM’s offers are accepted by
available candidates in some rounds. Denote the set of those rounds by Da and the set
of the rounds in which the DM’s offers are rejected in this SNE by Dr. The optimality
of the DM’s strategy implies that the candidate who is scheduled to receive an offer in
the last round in Da has a higher p (v) v than each candidate who is scheduled to receive
offers in Dr. By our assumption that vp (v) is strictly decreasing in v for v > v
?, if the
DM faces a realisation in which there are more than |Da| + k candidates with values
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greater than v?, then in the last round of Da, he will make an offer to a candidate
who is not among his k-most-valued candidates. When n is large relative to |Da|, the
probability of such a realisation is high. This leads to a contradiction to the existence
of an SNE in which the DM’s offers are accepted since it is not a best response for a
candidate to accept an offer in the last round in which he is supposed to accept it.
The argument presented above can be applied only when n is large relative to
the number of rounds in which offers are accepted with positive probability. When we
increase the number of candidates n, the set of SNEs changes, such that, potentially,
the number of rounds in which the DM’s offers are accepted with positive probability in
an SNE may increase when n rises. A key aspect of the proof is to show that for any n,
the number of rounds in which the DM’s offers are accepted with positive probability
in any SNE is bounded from above by some finite number T . In other words, for any
n, the DM has at most T opportunities to recruit a candidate. This technical result
implies that we can treat this game as one with a finite number of offers and apply the
argument presented in the previous paragraph when n is large.
The optimality of the DM’s strategy with respect to his preferences implies that
the DM cannot fully control the information he reveals to the candidates. Since the
candidates make negative inferences about their ranking from the DM’s scheduling
strategy, it makes sense to examine whether hiding his strategy can help the DM to
overcome the negative effect of the candidates’ social motives.
5 Private Offers
The model assumes that each candidate knows in which round he received an offer. We
now identify the conditions under which the DM is better off hiding this information
from the candidates. To do so, we examine an alternative model in which the offers are
made privately. Since the offers are private, a candidate can observe only whether he
received an offer or not. As a result, we need to redefine the candidates’ strategies. A
behavioural strategy γi ∈ [0, 1] for candidate i is the probability that i accepts the DM’s
offer in the case where he is available and receives one. Note that γi is not conditioned
on the round in which it is made since this is unobserved by i. As before, we restrict
our attention to SNEs and omit the subscript i such that γ is the probability that an
available candidate accepts an offer.
The fact that a candidate receives an offer is a positive signal about his relative
ranking. To see this, note that when offers are made privately, there is no cost in
approaching an unavailable candidate. Therefore, it is a dominant strategy for the DM
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to approach the candidates in the order of their values. It follows that the probability
of receiving an offer is higher for the candidates who are ranked higher on the DM’s
preference list.
The natural question to ask is which of the two offer regimes, private or public,
induces a greater payoff for the DM. In the next proposition, we shed light on this
matter and connect it to the intensity of the social motives. We restrict our attention
to the natural case of k = 1 and show that if c is large (small), then the private offers
regime induces a lower (higher) payoff for the DM than the highest SNE payoff under
the public offers regime.
Proposition 3 Let k = 1 and suppose that p (vh) < 1. There exists a number c
? such
that for every c < c? (c > c?), the DM’s highest SNE payoff under the public offers
regime is weakly lower (weakly higher) than his highest SNE payoff under the private
offers regime.
When the social component c is relatively low, the private offers regime induces a
strictly higher SNE payoff for the DM, compared to his payoff under the public-offers
regime. This is because under the public offers regime, if the DM approaches the
candidates according to their values, some of them will infer that they are not among
the k-most-valued candidates and, therefore, reject his offers. Under the private offers
regime, a candidate who receives an offer receives a positive signal about being one of
the k-most-valued candidates. Thus, the DM can make all of the candidates believe
that they are among the k-most-valued candidates with a probability of more than c−1
c
.
We established that if c is large, then the highest SNE payoff under public offers is
weakly greater than the one under private offers. In fact, the highest SNE payoff under
the public offers regime can be strictly greater than the latter. To see this, consider the
case of k = 1, vl > 1, and p (v) =
1
v
. If c is sufficiently large, the highest SNE payoff
under the private offers regime is 0. Under the public offers regime, there exists an SNE
in which the DM approaches his most-preferred candidate first (for every realisation),
σ1 = 1, and σt = 0 for t > 1.
The private offers regime induces a positive signal about the relative ranking of
candidates who receive offers. Under the public offers regime, some of the candidates
receive positive signals about their ranking when they are made an offer, while others
view the offer they receive as a negative signal about their ranking. While under private
offers more candidates receive positive signals about their ranking, these signals are not
sufficiently strong. Under public offers some candidates may receive stronger positive
signals, but others make negative inferences about their ranking from the information
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that they receive. When c is low, the intensity of the signal is not important and the
DM is better off making offers privately. When c is high, the intensity of the signal
matters and the DM can be strictly better off by making his offers publicly.
6 Related Literature
The model is related to the literature on interdependent preferences. Gul and Pe-
sendorfer (2016) provide a framework for studying interdependent preferences with
incomplete information. Avery and Levin (2010) study early admissions at selective
colleges using a model in which there are interdependencies between the preferences of
the colleges and those of the students. In their model, early admissions help students
to signal their preferences for one college or another. In the context of interdepen-
dent preferences, we are unaware of any other models in which agents’ preferences are
inferred from the timing of their actions.
Postlewaite (1998) provides an insightful discussion about incorporating concerns
for relative ranking into economic models. Antler (2015) studies the effect of social
preferences on the design of mechanisms for two-sided matching in a model of complete
information. The conventional two-sided matching problem is extended by allowing the
agents’ preferences to depend on the endogenous messages of agents on the other side
of the market and their interpretation by an audience of outside observers.
Our paper is related to the literature about contracting with externalities. In Jehiel
and Moldovanu (1995), there is a random order of meetings and exogenous negative
externalities that may lead to a delay in negotiations. In our model, the order is not
random, the externalities are endogenous, there is no delay, but there may be unravel-
ling. Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1996) take a mechanism design approach to
analyse a setting with exogenous contracting externalities.
Evidence from other fields: Social/psychological motives
Bretz, Gerhart, and Rynes (1991) interviewed university graduates about their job
search and choice decisions. They found that the vast majority of the subjects were
approached by some organisations late in the recruitment process and over 70 percent
of them attributed these delays to “personal rejection or relegation to second-choice
status.” The majority of those subjects stated that delays negatively affected their
willingness to accept job offers.
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Aronson and Worchel (1966), Curtis and Kim (1986), and Condon and Crano (1988)
presented subjects with false evidence that other subjects had indicated that they liked
them or enjoyed interacting with them. As a result, the liked subjects favoured these
other subjects and gave them more positive evaluations. In the context of hiring, Alder-
fer and McCord (1970) found a high correlation between job applicants’ expectations
of receiving a job offer from a potential employer and these applicants’ willingness to
accept such an offer.
7 Concluding Remarks
We presented a model in which social motives affect overall job satisfaction and, as a
result, an employer who wants to fill a vacancy must actively trade off between the
candidates’ value and availability. These social motives make the costs of pursuing the
employer’s top choice endogenous. Although our setting resembles a hiring situation,
similar social motives are also prevalent in the contexts of team formation and romantic
relationships.
For the DM, the problem is that some of the candidates who draw negative infer-
ences about their relative value are “insulted” and reject his offers. Since the DM will
inevitably “insult” some of the candidates, he prefers to insult those who are less likely
to accept his offers in the first place, and this only exacerbates the adverse effect of the
social motives. Since the DM targets candidates who are more likely to be available,
candidates who receive an offer in a round in which they are supposed to accept it infer
that they are unlikely to be the most-preferred ones. The candidates’ inferences make
the strategic choice of the DM significantly more complicated and create inefficiencies
as efficient matches do not occur in equilibrium.
The model captures considerations that play a significant role in many real-world
situations. For example, a job-market candidate will prefer going to an academic
department that likes him better. In the real world, additional considerations might
come into play but as long as wages are not fully adjustable, social motives will have an
effect on the efficiency of the outcome of the recruiting process. Prominent examples
where wages are not fully adjustable are public positions (e.g., the chair of a public
committee or a central bank) and senior functionaries in international institutions (e.g.,
the IMF).
We have shown that making offers privately cannot help the DM when the social
motives are strong. We now examine a few other variants of the model and compare
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the DM’s highest SNE payoff to his highest SNE payoff in the baseline model.
Reducing the number of offers
A natural question to ask is whether the DM can gain by committing to make a lower
number of offers (fewer than n offers). Such a commitment cannot benefit the DM
when the number of candidates is large. To see this, suppose that the DM commits ex
ante to make only y < n− ck
c−1 offers and consider an SNE in this game. In the game
without commitment there is an SNE in which the DM and the candidates behave as
in the game with commitment in the first y rounds. From round y + 1 onward, all of
the DM’s offers are rejected and he randomises uniformly among the permutations.
Reference groups
Individuals often compare themselves to people whose characteristics and abilities are
similar to theirs. For example, in the context of the present paper, it is plausible
that a candidate who finds it insulting to be “second choice” to a candidate similar
to him (i.e., of his calibre) may not be so offended if someone who is a “superstar” is
preferred to him. We now modify the model so that each candidate cares only about his
ranking within his reference group. Thus, in the “superstar” example, non-superstars
care only about their ranking among other non-superstars. Intuitively, superstars are
far less likely to be available than non-superstars. Therefore, a candidate’s lack of
availability implies that he is more likely to be a superstar. As a rough approximation
of this situation, suppose that each candidate’s reference group coincides with the set
of available candidates (i.e., each available candidate prefers to accept the DM’s offer
over rejecting if and only if he is among the k-most-valued available candidates). This
would fit the “superstar” story in the extreme case in which the distribution over types
and availability is such that lack of availability implies that the candidate is a superstar
with a very high probability.
We now show that in this extreme example, the inefficiency problem disappears
as there exists an SNE in which the DM always recruits the most-valued available
candidate.4 Consider a profile of strategies in which every available candidate always
accepts the DM’s offers and the DM approaches the candidates in the order of their
values. Given this profile, a candidate i who receives an offer in round t infers that
4Other SNEs may also exist. In particular, if the set of candidates is large, then there exist SNEs
in which all of the candidates reject the DM’s offers regardless of their availability.
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the first t− 1 candidates who received offers are unavailable and that these candidates
are the only ones whose value is greater than vi. Hence, each available candidate who
receives an offer infers that he is the most-valued among the available ones and ac-
cepts the DM’s offer. From the DM’s perspective, since there is no cost of delay in
the model and available candidates always accept his offers, approaching candidates
who are unlikely to be available is not costly. This makes it optimal for the DM to
approach the candidates in the order of their values and allows him to avoid offending
his most-preferred available candidate. This extreme example suggests that reference
group considerations are likely to weaken the negative forces we identified in the paper.
The benefit of randomising by delegation
The DM in our model can strictly benefit from using the following two-stage procedure.
In the first round, the DM narrows down the set of candidates I to the top z < n
candidates on his preference list. In the second round, the DM commits to randomise
uniformly by delegating the scheduling problem to an uninformed agent.
To demonstrate how the DM can benefit from such a procedure, consider the case
of k = 1, c close to 1, and assume that p (v) v is constant. In any SNE of our baseline
model, the DM’s offers are accepted by available candidates in at most one round. To
see this, observe that if t and t′ are the last two rounds in which offers are accepted by
available candidates, then the optimality of the DM’s strategy implies that the value
of the candidate who receives an offer in round t cannot be lower than the value of
the candidate who receives an offer in round t′ > t. Therefore, accepting an offer in
round t′ cannot be a best response. The same argument implies that even if the DM
were to commit to make offers only to the top z > 1 candidates, the candidates would
accept those offers in at most one round. Therefore, committing to make offers to the
top z candidates would have no effect on the DM’s highest SNE payoff, which is p (v) v
in both cases. That is, narrowing down the set of candidates to the top ones without
randomisation does not change the DM’s payoff. How can randomisation help the DM
to obtain a higher payoff?
If the DM could commit ex ante to make z > 1 offers and randomise uniformly
among the top z < n candidates, then each candidate who receives an offer would
believe that he was ranked first with a probability of more than c−1
c
. Therefore, he
would accept the DM’s offer. As a result, the DM’s payoff would be strictly greater
than the maximal SNE payoff in the “no commitment” case and in the case of com-
mitting to make offers to the top z candidates without the additional commitment to
16
randomisation.
The fact that the decision is delegated to an uninformed party plays a key role in
this setting as it allows the DM to hide information that may offend some candidates
and make them reject his offers. This provides a rationale to hiring procedures that may
seem inefficient at a glance. For instance, letting human resources have the ultimate say
on whether a candidate should be hired or not (or letting a dean who is not particularly
knowledgeable in a field decide on the the order of offers) can mitigate the adverse effect
of social motives and increase the probability of hiring a suitable candidate.
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Appendix
Proof of Claim 2
Given the candidates’ strategies, the DM is indifferent between both permutations.
Therefore, it is left to check the candidates’ strategies. Consider an arbitrary available
candidate i. His interim belief about vi is
f (vi|si = 1) = 2 (1− v)∫ 1
0.5
2 (1− v) dv = 8 (1− v) (1)
It follows that
Pr (vi > vj 6=i|si = 1) =
∫ 1
0.5
8 (1− v) 2 (v − 0.5) dv = 1
3
(2)
Since σ1 = 0 and the DM mixes uniformly between the two permutations, candidate i




(1− c) < 0
and so rejecting the DM’s offers is a best response in both rounds.
Proof of Claim 3
The proof is a special case of Claim 4. The nonexistence of an SNE in which offers are
accepted with some probability in one of the rounds and always rejected in the other
round (e.g., an SNE in which σ1 > 0 and σ2 = 0) follows from Case 1 of Claim 4. The
fact that there exists no SNE in which the DM’s offers are accepted in both rounds
(i.e., an SNE in which σ1 > 0 and σ2 > 0) follows from Case 3 of Claim 4.
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Claim 4 and asymmetric equilibria in the two-candidate
example
First, we shall demonstrate the existence of a Nash equilibrium in which the DM’s
strategy does not treat the candidates in a symmetric manner. Consider a profile
of strategies in which the DM always makes the first offer to a specific candidate i
and both candidates always reject the DM’s offers. Given the candidates’ strategies,
the DM’s strategy is optimal. Since the DM’s strategy is independent of the can-
didates’ values, they do not learn anything from the fact that the DM approaches i
first. Candidate i rejects the DM’s offer independently of si since, as we showed in (2),
Pr (vi > vj|si = 1) < 12 . Therefore, the candidate j who is approached second does not
learn anything from the fact that i rejected the first offer. This implies that, condi-
tional on being available, it is a best response for j to reject the DM’s second offer.
We can set the candidates’ beliefs off the equilibrium path such that if i (respectively,
j) receives an offer in the second (respectively, first) round, then he believes that he is
the least-valued candidate with probability 1 and rejects the DM’s offer.
The above example demonstrates that when the symmetry assumption is relaxed,
the candidates’ beliefs need not have full support (the candidates’ beliefs have full sup-
port if, in every round, each candidate believes that there is strictly positive probability
that he will receive an offer). The example also shows that we are free to choose the
candidates’ beliefs off the equilibrium path as we wish. We would like to emphasise
that we refrain from placing any restriction on the candidates’ off-path beliefs since
any such restriction would strengthen the solution concept and weaken the negative
result of Claim 4.
Claim 4 In every Nash equilibrium, all of the DM’s offers are rejected (regardless of
the candidates’ availability).
Proof. Since we relax the symmetry assumption for this claim, we must add a sub-
script to the description of each candidate’s strategy. For every round t ∈ {1, 2} and
every candidate i, denote by σti the probability that candidate i accepts an offer that is
made in round t when he is available. There are three cases that we need to address. In
the first and second cases, there is no candidate i for whom both σ1i > 0 and σ
2
i > 0. In
the third case, there is at least one candidate who accepts the DM’s offer with strictly
positive probability in both rounds.
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Case 1: Nonexistence of a Nash equilibrium in which both candidates accept offers in
round t and reject them in round t′ 6= t.
Assume by negation that σti > 0, σ
t
j > 0, σ
t′
i = 0, and σ
t′
j = 0 are part of a Nash equilib-
rium. Consider round t. If vi (1− vi)σti > vj (1− vj)σtj (respectively, vi (1− vi)σti <
vj (1− vj)σtj), then the DM’s unique best response is to make an offer to candidate
i (respectively, j). Without loss of generality, assume that σti ≤ σtj. Observe that
vi (1− vi)σti > vj (1− vj)σtj only if vj > vi. Hence, if candidate i receives an offer in
round t, then he must infer that vi < vj, and, therefore, reject this offer. This is in
contradiction to the assumption that σti > 0 is part of a Nash equilibrium.
In the next two cases, the candidates’ beliefs need not have full support. Before we
proceed to the proofs of Cases 2 and 3, it will be useful to show that if the candidates’













4α (pi?|vi, vj) dvidvj = 1. Consider the candidate i who receives an
offer first according to pi?. Since the DM approaches candidate i first with probability
1, the latter does not receive any additional information from the fact that he receives
an offer in round 1. Formally, conditional on both si = 1 and receiving an offer in




























(1− c) < 0, such that rejecting the DM’s first offer
is the unique best response for candidate i. It follows that σ1i = 0. Hence, candidate
j 6= i does not learn any information from the fact that i rejects the first offer. Using
a similar argument, it is possible to show that, conditional on both receiving an offer




the DM’s second offer is the unique best response for candidate j. Observe that since
σ1i = σ
2
j = 0, for (almost) every realisation, the DM’s payoff is 0 in this equilibrium. It
follows that σ2i = σ
1
j = 0 (otherwise, the DM could make a strictly positive expected
payoff by deviating to a different permutation).
Case 2: Nonexistence of a Nash equilibrium in which σti > 0, σ
t




Assume by negation that σti > 0, σ
t
j = 0, and σ
t′ 6=t
i = 0 are part of a Nash equilibrium.
The DM’s unique5 best response is to approach candidate i (respectively, j) in round
t (respectively, t′ 6= t) since any other strategy guarantees him a payoff of 0. Thus,
the candidates’ beliefs do not have full support. The rest of the proof follows from the
above argument.
Case 3: Nonexistence of a Nash equilibrium in which σ1i > 0 and σ
2
i > 0.
Assume by negation that σ1i > 0 and σ
2
i > 0 are part of a Nash equilibrium. Either the
candidates’ beliefs have full support or not. Since the latter case is already proven, we
focus on the former one and assume that the candidates’ beliefs have full support. Let
pi? be a permutation under which i receives an offer in round 1. The LHS of the next
inequality, which represents i’s belief that he is the most-valued candidate conditional
on being available and receiving an offer in round 1, is well defined since i’s beliefs have
full support. It is greater than 1
2












The LHS of the next inequality, which represents candidate i’s belief that he is the most-
valued candidate, conditional on receiving an offer in round 2 and being available, is
also well defined by our “full support” assumption. It is greater than 1
2
since σ2i > 0 is




(1− α (pi?|vi, vj)) (1− vi)
(






(1− α (pi?|vi, vj)) (1− vi)
(





















(1− α (pi?|vi, vj)) (1− vi)
(
1− σ1j (1− vj)
)




(1− α (pi?|vi, vj)) (1− vi)
(
1− σ1j (1− vj)
)
dvidvj
5Except for the case of vi = vj = 1 in which the DM is indifferent between the two permutations.
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(1− α (pi?|vi, vj))σ1j (1− vi) (1− vj) dvidvj
The LHS of (8) is independent of α and equals −1
48
. The RHS of (8) is minimised when
σ1j = 1 and α (v
?|vi, vj) = 0 (respectively, α (v?|vi, vj) = 1) if vj > vi (respectively, vi >





(1− vi) (1− vj) dvidvj = −1128 . Hence,
conditions (4) and (5) cannot both hold. This is in contradiction to the assumption
that there exists a Nash equilibrium in which both σ1i > 0 and σ
2
i > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1
Let σ1 = ... = σn = 0. Clearly, each strategy is a best response for the DM. Since p (v)
is weakly decreasing in v, each available candidate believes that he is one of the DM’s
k-most-valued candidates with a probability of at most k
n
. Since σ1 = ... = σn = 0
and the DM mixes uniformly among permutations, the candidates do not receive any




, it follows that σ1 = ... = σn = 0
are best responses.
Proof of Proposition 2
Before we proceed with the proof, we need some additional notation. We denote a
profile of candidates’ strategies (σ1, ..., σn) by σ. For each realisation (v1, ..., vn), per-
mutation pi, and profile of candidates’ strategies σ, we use Vt (pi, σ, v1, ..., vn) to denote
the continuation value of a DM who schedules offers according to the permutation
pi (from round 1) and all of his offers in rounds 1, ..., t − 1 were rejected. Define
Vt (α, σ, v1, ..., vn) := minpi|α(pi|v1,...,vn)>0Vt (pi, σ, v1, ..., vn). Let T (σ) := {t ∈ N |σt > 0}
denote the set of rounds in which the DM’s offers might be accepted given the profile
of candidates’ strategies σ.
The candidate who receives an offer in round t is said to be active if he is available
and the offers in rounds 1, ..., t − 1 were rejected. We denote the probability that the
candidate who receives an offer in round t is active given the profile of strategies (α, σ)
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α (pi|v1, ..., vn)
(
1− σ1p (vpi1(v1,...,vn))) ... (9)(
1− σt−1p (vpit−1(v1,...,vn))) p (vpit(v1,...,vn)) f (v1) ...f (vn) dv1...dvn
Denote the probability that the candidate who receives an offer in round t is active and
the candidate who receives an offer in round r is one of the k-most-valued candidates








α (pi|v1, ..., vn)1r (pi, v1, ..., vn)
(
1− σ1p (vpi1(v1,...,vn))) ... (10)(
1− σt−1p (vpit−1(v1,...,vn))) p (vpit(v1,...,vn)) f (v1) ...f (vn) dv1...dvn,
where 1r (pi, v1, ..., vn) ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator that equals 1 if and only if the candidate
who receives an offer in round r ∈ N according to pi is one of the k-most-valued
candidates, that is, if xpir(v1,...,vn) < k. Observe that
λtt(α,σ)
λt(α,σ)
is the probability that a
candidate who is active in round t assigns to the event that he is one of the k-most-
valued candidates given the profile (α, σ).
Let (αˆn, σˆn)
∞
n=1 be a sequence of SNEs such that (αˆn, σˆn) is played in the game with
n candidates. Our objective in the following four lemmata is to show that there exists
a number T > 0 such that |T (σˆn) | < T for every n ∈ N (that is, to show that the
number of rounds in which the DM’s offers might be accepted is bounded from above).
Let us assume by negation that this is not the case. For each m ∈ N, define n (m) to
be the lowest n for which |T (σˆn) | ≥ m. Observe that n (m) ≥ m. For every m ∈ N,




. That is, (α˜m, σ˜m)
∞
m=1 is a sequence of SNEs such
that (α˜m, σ˜m) is played in the game with n (m) candidates and |T (σ˜m) | ≥ m.
For each m ∈ N and z = 1, ...,m, define Tzm to be an arbitrary subset of T (σ˜m)
that satisfies
(a) |Tzm| = z.
(b) If t, t′′ ∈ Tzm, t′ 6∈ Tzm, and t > t′ > t′′, then t′ 6∈ T (σ˜m).
Lemma 1 will show that there is a number of rounds z such that for every m ≥ z,
every set of rounds Tzm includes at least one round t in which offers are accepted with
a probability of more than z (i.e., σ
t ≥ z), where z > 0 is independent of m.
Lemma 1 There exist two numbers, z ∈ N and z ∈ (0, 1), such that for each m ≥ z
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and each Tzm, there exists a round t ∈ Tzm such that σ˜tm ≥ z.
Proof. Consider z > 2k, m ≥ z, Tzm ⊆ T (σ˜m), and use λ?zm to denote the median
value of {λt (α˜m, σ˜m) |t ∈ Tzm}. Define two disjoint sets of b z2c rounds, T ?zm ⊂ Tzm and
T ??zm ⊂ Tzm, such that for each t ∈ T ?zm, λt (α˜m, σ˜m) ≤ λ?zm, and for each t ∈ T ??zm,
λt (α˜m, σ˜m) ≥ λ?zm.
Consider r ∈ Tzm. Let us look at (10) for λtr (α˜m, σ˜m). The weight of each reali-
sation (v1, ..., vn) and permutation pi such that α˜m (pi|v1, ..., vn)1r (pi, v1, ..., vn) > 0 is





















Since 1r (pi, v1, ..., vn) = 1, there are at least b z2c − k candidates who receive offers in




) ≥ p (vpir(v1,...,vn)). Denote  := max {σ˜tm|t ∈ Tzm}. Since p (v) ≤ 1, and
σ˜im ≤  for each i ∈ Tzm,
wt
(
σ˜m, pi, v1, ..., vn(m)
) ≥ wr (σ˜m, pi, v1, ..., vn(m)) (1− )z
for each round t that is one of the b z
2








. Observe that in the last transition we used property (b) and the
fact that each round t 6∈ T (σ˜m) can be ignored since σ˜tm = 0. It follows that∑
t∈T ?zm λtr (α˜m, σ˜m) ≥ (1− )
z (⌊ z
2
⌋− k)λrr (α˜m, σ˜m) for each r ∈ Tzm.
Since λtr(α˜m,σ˜m)
λt(α˜m,σ˜m)
is the probability that a candidate who is active in the t-th round
assigns to the event that the candidate who receives an offer in the r-th round is one














































It follows that for a sufficiently large z and m ≥ z, it must be that  is greater than
some z > 0 that is independent of m.
Lemma 1 establishes that for large values of m, at least bm
z
c of the DM’s offers are
accepted (by available candidates) with a probability of more than z > 0. In Lemmata




For every m ∈ N, let (v˜1, ..., v˜n(m)) be an arbitrary realisation of candidates’ values such
that | {i|vi ∈ (vh − 2¯, vh − ¯)} | ≥ δm. Observe that if δ < F (vh − ¯) − F (vh − 2¯),
then the probability of such a realisation approaches 1 as m goes to infinity.
Lemma 2 Fix t ∈ N. There exists a number mt ∈ N such that for each m ≥ mt,
Vj
(
α˜m, σ˜m, v˜1, ..., v˜n(m)
)
> vh−3¯ for each j ∈ {t′ ∈ T (σ˜m) : | {t¯ ∈ T (σ˜m) : t¯ ≤ t′} | ≤ t}
(i.e., for each of the first t rounds of T (σ˜)).
Proof. Denote the following strategy by α′: in each round t ∈ T (σ˜m) make an offer to
the lowest-valued candidate among those with value v > vh−2¯ who did not receive an
offer previously. If such a candidate does not exist, make an offer to the highest-valued
candidate who did not receive an offer previously. In each round t 6∈ T (σ˜m) make an
offer to an arbitrary candidate whose value is v ≤ vh − 2¯. If such a candidate does
not exist, make an offer to the highest-valued candidate who did not receive an offer
previously.
For j = 1, ..., |T (σ˜m) |, denote the following strategy by βj. First, the DM chooses




> 0. Up to the j-th round
of T (σ˜m), the DM makes the offers in each round t ∈ T (σ˜m) according to pi. In the
remaining rounds (i.e., N/T (σ˜m)), the DM makes the offers according to the rule that
defines α′. Let us denote the j-th round of T (σ˜m) by j?. By the optimality of α˜m, it
must be that Vj?
(
βj, σ˜m, v˜1, ..., v˜n(m)
) ≤ Vj? (pi, σ˜m, v˜1, ..., v˜n(m)). Moreover, if t < j and
t? is the t-th round of T (σ˜m), then Vt?
(
βt, σ˜m, v˜1, ..., v˜n(m)
) ≤ Vt? (pi, σ˜m, v˜1, ..., v˜n(m)).
By construction, according to βj, in the rounds {t′ ∈ T (σ˜m) |t′ ≥ j?}, the DM makes





. By Lemma 1, there is a number z ∈ N such that at least
b bδmc−j+1
z
c of these offers are accepted with a probability of more than zp (vh − ¯) > 0.
If we chose a sufficiently large m, then Vj?
(
βj, σ˜m, v˜1, ..., v˜n(m)
)
> vh− 3¯. If t < j and
t? is the t-th round of T (σ˜m), then Vt?
(
βt, σ˜m, v˜1, ..., v˜n(m)
)
> vh − 3¯. Since we made
no restriction about pi, it follows that for a sufficiently large m, for each of the first t
rounds of T (σ˜), Vt
(
α˜m, σ˜m, v˜1, ..., v˜n(m)
)
> vh − 3¯.
In Lemma 2 we considered the first t rounds of T (σ˜m). We showed that for large
values of m, the DM’s continuation value in these rounds is arbitrarily close to vh when
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. We now exploit this lemma to show that when m
is large, in the first t rounds of T (σ˜) the DM approaches candidates whose value is
arbitrarily close to vh.
Lemma 3 Fix t ∈ N,  > 0. There exists a number m (t, ) such that for each m ≥




and makes an offer to a candidate
with a value v < vh − 4¯ in round j ∈ {t′ ∈ T (σ˜m) : | {t¯ ∈ T (σ˜m) : t¯ ≤ t′} | ≤ t}, then
σ˜jm < .





is scheduled to receive an offer in round j, which is one of the first t rounds of T (σ˜m),




> 0, then, by definition,
Vj
(
pim, σ˜m, v˜1, ..., v˜n(m)
)






pim, σ˜m, v˜1, ..., v˜n(m)
)
By Lemma 2, there exists a number mj+1 such that if m > mj+1, then vh − 3¯ <
Vj
(
α˜m, σ˜m, v˜1, ..., v˜n(m)
)
and vh−3¯ < Vj+1
(
α˜m, σ˜m, v˜1, ..., v˜n(m)
)
. Consider m > mj+1.
Suppose that there exists a round r such that σ˜rm = 0. It must be that in round r
the DM makes an offer to a candidate i′ with a value vi′ ≤ vi. Otherwise, the DM could
do better by switching between i and i′, which is in contradiction to the optimality of
pim and α˜m.
It follows that by round j (which is one of the first t rounds of T (σ˜m)) the DM
makes at most t− 1 offers to candidates with a value v ∈ (vh − 2¯, vh − ¯). There are
at least bδmc − t + 1 candidates with a value v ∈ (vh − 2¯, vh − ¯) who do not receive
an offer by round j. Denote the set of rounds in which they are scheduled to receive
offers according to pim by Q. Let σ˜
min
m := min {σ˜tm : t ∈ Q}.
Suppose that the game has reached round j (that is, the DM’s offers in rounds
1, ..., j − 1 were rejected). The probability that the last (according to pim) of the
candidates with a value v ∈ (vh − 2¯, vh − ¯) will receive an offer must be lower than
(1− σ˜minm p (vh − ¯))bδmc−t as this happens only if bδmc − t such candidates reject the
DM’s offers. For each ′ > 0, there exists m
′ ∈ N such that for each m > m′ , σ˜minm < ′
or (1− σ˜minm p (vh − ¯))bδmc−t < ′. This implies that for a sufficiently large m, the DM
could switch between i (who receives an offer in round j and has a value of vi < vh−4¯)
and a candidate with a value vi′ > vh − 2¯, while making an arbitrarily small change
to Vj+1
(
pim, σ˜m, v˜1, ..., v˜n(m)
)
. Since p (vi′) ≤ p (vi) and Vj+1
(
α˜m, σ˜m, v˜1, ..., v˜n(m)
)
>
vh − 3¯, if σ˜j ≥ , we get a contradiction to the optimality of pim and α˜m.
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In Lemma 4 we show that the number of rounds in which the DM’s offers might be
accepted in an SNE is bounded from above.
Lemma 4 There exists a number T > 0 such that for every n ∈ N, |T (σˆn) | < T .
Proof. Assume to the contrary that the claim is false. Then, the sequence (α˜m, σ˜m)
∞
m=1
can be defined as before. Fix an arbitrarily small ¯ > 0 and let δ (¯) := F (vh−¯)−F (vh−2¯)
2
.
By Lemma 3, for every t ∈ N and  > 0, there exists a number m (t, ) such that if
m > m (t, ) and | {i|vi ∈ (vh − 2¯, vh − ¯)} | ≥ δ (¯)m, then in each round j such that
j ∈ {t′ ∈ T (σ˜m) : | {t¯ ∈ T (σ˜m) : t¯ ≤ t′} | ≤ t}, the DM makes an offer to a candidate
with a value v > vh − 4¯ or σ˜jm < .
LetBt = {t′ ∈ T (σ˜m) : | {t¯ ∈ T (σ˜m) : t¯ ≤ t′} | ≤ t} and consider λjr (α˜m, σ˜m), where
j ∈ Bt and r ∈ N . Observe that the probability that the values’ realisation is such
that | {i|vi ∈ (vh − 2¯, vh − ¯)} | ≥ δ (¯)m approaches 1 as m goes to infinity. Let us










, and two permutations,
pi and pi′, such that α˜m (pi|v˜1, ..., v˜n) > 0 and α˜m (pi′|v˜′1, ..., v˜′n) > 0. One can choose







) that are given in (11) is arbitrarily close to 1. This follows from the
fact that in each round t ≤ j such that σ˜tm > , the DM approaches candidates with
a value v > vh − 4¯. We can now apply an argument that is similar to the one we
















≤∑j∈Bt∑r∈N λjr(α˜mσ˜m)λj(α˜mσ˜m) = k|Bt|.
Proof of the proposition
By Lemma 4, there exists a number T > 0 such that for every n ∈ N, |T (σˆn) | < T .
Let us choose a large n? and consider a realisation in which there are more than T + k
candidates with a value v > v? (the probability of such a realisation goes to 1 as n
goes to infinity). Consider the last round t ∈ T (σˆn). There must be at least k + 1
candidates who are scheduled to receive an offer in rounds {t} ∪ N/T (σˆn) and who
each have a value greater than v?. The optimality of the DM’s strategy requires that
in round t, he make an offer to the candidate for whom vp (v) is maximised (among
the candidates who are scheduled to receive offers in rounds {t} ∪N/T (σˆn)). By the
assumption that vp (v) is strictly decreasing for v > v?, there are at least k candidates
who are more valued than the candidate who is approached in round t. Therefore,
σˆtn > 0 cannot be a part of an SNE.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the private offers regime and suppose that there exists an SNE such that
γ > 0. Let t ∈ {1, ..., n}. Recall that the DM’s unique best response is to approach
the candidates according to the order of their values. It follows that





1t−1 (v1, ..., vn)
(





f (v1) ...f (vn) dv1...dvn,
where pi is a permutation such that vpi1(v1,...,vn) ≥ ... ≥ vpin(v1,...,vn) and 1t−1 (v1, ..., vn) ∈
{0, 1} is an indicator that equals 1 if and only if xi = t − 1. Note that (12) is de-
creasing in γ for t ≥ 2. For t = 1, (12) does not depend on γ. It follows that
Pr {xi = 0|si = 1, i receives an offer } is increasing in γ. In words, when γ is higher,
receiving an offer is a stronger signal of being the most-valued candidate. It follows
that if there exists an SNE in which γ > 0, then there exists an SNE in which γ = 1.
Fix c?. If there exists an SNE in which γ = 1, then for c < c? there exists an SNE
in which γ = 1. If there exists no SNE in which γ = 1, then for c > c?, there exists no
SNE in which γ > 0. An SNE in which γ = 1 and the DM approaches the candidates
according to their values induces the highest possible payoff for the DM and an SNE
in which σ = 0 induces the lowest possible payoff for the DM.
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